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Is China a Responsible Developing Country?
Climate Change Diplomacy and
National Image Building

Sanna Kopra

Abstract
A state’s image is an important resource for wielding national
power in global politics. Its prestige and reputation often influence
the interactions with other states. As an emerging superpower,
China is under pressure to shoulder more responsibility for
tackling global climate change. The West has criticized China as a
“climate criminal” that threatens global climate stability. In
response, the Chinese government implemented a series of
comprehensive programs to improve its image abroad. This paper
examines China’s national image building in the realm of
international climate politics. It draws on the official rhetoric and
policy statements to discuss the innovative strategies that China
employed to advance its broader diplomatic agendas. By referring
to itself as a developing country, China proclaims that it has neither
a historical responsibility nor the resources to mitigate climate
change, and that it desperately needs the financial and
technological support from the West. By employing the rhetoric of
being a peace-loving and harmonious nation, China has begun to
address the problems of global climate change, even though it
refuses to submit to any binding emission reduction targets in the
negotiations over a post-Kyoto international climate agreement.
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Is China a Responsible Developing Country?
Climate Change Diplomacy and
National Image Building∗

Sanna Kopra

1. Introduction
China has played an important but contradictory role in
international climate change politics. On the one hand, China is a
developing country where millions of people still live in poverty;
on the other hand, with the intensive use of coal, it has become the
world’s biggest emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2). The continuation
of the business-as-usual policy in China would lead to a rise of
2.7°C in global temperatures by 2050, even if all the countries in
the world achieved an 80% reduction in their greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions (Watts, June 9, 2009). According to Richard N.
Cooper (2008: 4–10), China’s total demand for energy grows by
4.1% annually until 2025, and this makes up 12% of the world’s oil
consumption and 39% of the world’s coal consumption.
Furthermore, China’s CO2 emissions grow by 4% every year, even
though its energy efficiency improves by 1.9% annually until 2025
and its greenhouse gas emissions per citizen are lower than those
of the developed world. In 2009, the CO2 emissions per capita
were 5.13 tons in China, 7.54 tons in the United Kingdom, and 16.9
tons in the United States (International Energy Agency, 2011).
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As China rises to power in the twenty-first century, there is a
growing body of literature on its foreign policy. Many analysts
perceive China as “harmful, destabilizing, and even pernicious,”
threatening international order (Deng, 2006: 186). China has
dismissed such criticisms and redoubled the efforts to improve its
international status “as it were the most desirable value, the one
that leads to power, security, and respect” (Deng, 2008: 8). Peter
Hays Gries (2005: 103–105) explains that nationalism is “designed
to restore, maintain, or advance public images of the nation,” and
it serves as “a key–if not the key–motivator of Chinese foreign
policy.” The Communist leaders often refer to the so-called
century of national humiliation (1839-1949) in which the West
undermined China as the world’s most sophisticated civilization,
and call for the need to reconstruct the Chinese identity against the
West and to restore the country’s prestige.
For years, the developed countries have called China a
“climate criminal” that threatens global climate stability. They
complain that the priorities of China’s environmental diplomacy
are to “protect its sovereignty, acquire foreign aid and technical
assistance, and promote its economic development” (Harris, 2005:
24). After the U.N. Copenhagen Conference in 2009, China was
accused of “blocking the progress” on climate and environmental
protection, even though the United States has done little to
address the issue (Lynas, December 22, 2009; Vidal, December 20,
2009). It took a long time before China admitted being the world’s
largest CO2 emitter. After the Copenhagen Conference, China
sought to improve its status abroad, but most conventional studies
have overlooked China’s attempt at national image building.
This article argues that China’s pursuit for a respectable
image is at the center of its climate change diplomacy. Through a
critical analysis of the Chinese policy statements, this study shows
2
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that the government deliberately presents itself “as a peace loving,
responsible actor” and “as a poor developing country.” Both
discourses are designed to accomplish the broader diplomatic
agendas. The rhetoric of being “a responsible actor” enables China
to raise its international profile and pursue its interests more easily;
and that of being “a poor developing country” underlines its need
for foreign assistance. These discourses justify China’s decision to
reject any binding CO2 emission reduction targets in the
negotiations over a post-Kyoto climate agreement.

2. China’s National Image Building
A state’s image is an important resource for wielding national
power in global politics. During the Cold War, the realistic school
of international relations emphasized the pursuit of prestige,
image, and reputation in order to win the balance of power. In the
1960s, Hans J. Morgenthau stated that the national image or “the
mental picture–that is, our prestige” “determinates what we are as
members of society.” Individuals and states seek to be reputable
because “in the struggle for existence and power…what others
think about us is as important as what we actually are.” Hence, a
“policy of prestige” is “an indispensable element of a rational
foreign policy; states strive to impress other nations with the
power one’s own nation actually possesses, or with the power it
believes, or wants the other nations to believe, it possesses”
(Morgenthau, 1993: 84–93). Similarly, Daniel J. Boorstin explains
that prestige is determined by the others’ respect for one’s image:
When we talk of prestige abroad, we are talking not of
ourselves, but of the shadows of ourselves which we can
somehow project. To compare prestige, then, is to compare
3
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the appeal of images. To insist on our prestige is to insist on
the appeal of our image (Boorstin, 1977: 247).
Both Morgenthau and Boorstin agree that one’s prestige
determinates one’s role in society. In order to gain prestige, we try
to improve our image rather than ourselves because we “live in
our world of illusions” (Boorstin, 1977: 249). Robert Jervis (1970)
applies this principle to the study of international relations and
shows that as rational actors, modern states continue to project
their desired images to achieve political objectives. Jervis defines
an actor as “those of his beliefs about the other that affect his
predictions of how the other will behave under various
circumstances.” The image of a state often influences the
interactions with other states. A good image generates trust and
cooperation, whereas a bad one provokes hostile reactions and
undermines the state’s security. Therefore, the image of a state is a
key factor determining “whether and how easily the state can
reach its goals”—perhaps even more significant than the
expansion of military and economic power (Jervis, 1970: 5–8).
Building up a favorable image is essential for attaining a
competitive ranking in the world because some states rank better
than the others. If only one country existed in the world, it would
not concern about its image. Because of the interstate competition,
national image building is critical to national security. According
to the realists of politics, the image of a state can wield an
important degree of deterrence. Niccolò Machiavelli argued
centuries ago that if a state had a reputation of strength and power,
other states would not dare to challenge or lie to it (Machiavelli,
1988: 64). By drawing on the concept of national image building to
analyze
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acknowledges the limitations of realism in global politics. For
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example, hard factors such as economic and military power play a
less important role in the image building process. As the world is
becoming more interdependent than before, many states seek to
present themselves as responsible, cooperative, and credible
members of the global community. The cost of non-credibility is
incalculable, and credibility–“to be believed–is a significant source
of attraction and soft power” (Nye Jr., 2004: 31). The image of
states often determines the level of soft power that they have, and
states can easily increase their global influence by making
themselves more appealing to the world (Koski, 2005).
In the Chinese context, the concept of face refers to human
concerns over honor and respect. As Peter Hays Gries (2004: 24)
explains, face is “fundamentally political, involving a contest over
power,” and the respect for China’s national face in the
international arena is an important motivator of the Chinese
foreign policy. Keeping face means “maintaining authority” and
the state’s national honor; losing face means “losing status and the
ability to pursue instrumental goals” (Ibid., 29). The Chinese can
“give face” (liu mianzi) to one another in order to maintain
interpersonal harmony. The government does the likewise and
insists on other countries to treat it as an equal. Since the 1990s,
China has “gradually realized the importance of setting up a
positive image in its relations with the outside world” (Jing, 2007:
25). According to Wang Hongying (2005), the post-Maoist state has
projected an image “as an international co-operator” in global
economy and politics. At present, there is a “scholarly consensus
that the Chinese foreign policy has countered its negative
reputation through a commitment to building a cooperative,
responsible image in international society” (Deng, 2006: 186). The
study of China’s image building should throw light on the
complexity of the state’s diplomatic behaviors. Wang Hongying
5
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(2005: 89–92) identifies four types of image-behavior relationships.
First, there is “a big cap between China’s projected images and its
foreign policy behavior” because images and behavior often have
little in common. Second, China’s projected images do not have
any causal effect on foreign policy behavior, but these images help
to justify the government’s policies at home and abroad. Third, the
government “may calculatingly engage in foreign policy behavior
according to its projected images to give credibility to the latter.”
Fourth, the government “may unthinkingly choose its foreign
policies according to its projected images because these images
indeed reflect the leadership’s conception of China’s role in
international affairs.” Many international actors are aware of
China’s obsession with image building, and they are keen to
encourage China to become a cooperative and responsible player.

3. China as a Peace-loving and Responsible Actor
China has actively participated in the international negotiations on
climate change. As China announced in its Climate Change White
Paper, it made a “significant contribution to addressing global
climate change.” Moreover, China always emphasized its “key
role in breaking the negotiation deadlock and promoting
consensus among all the parties” in the Copenhagen Conference. It
highlighted Hu Jintao’s call for consensus over the climate change
negotiation and Wen Jiabao’s “outstanding contributions” to the
Copenhagen Conference (Information Office of the State Council
of the People’s Republic of China, 2011). At the 2011 Durban
Climate Change Conference, China installed its first pavilion,
indicating its determination to tackle climate change and global
warming (The People’s Daily, December 5, 2011). Since 2004, the
rhetoric of “peaceful development” has become an integral part of
6
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the Chinese diplomacy. China renounced the pursuit of hegemony
and opposed external intervention into the internal affairs of
another country. Instead of adhering to the Cold War ideology of
zero-sum security based on military force, China has emphasized
the importance of “win-win” security and progress in global
politics (Shirk, 2007: 129). It pledges to strengthen international
cooperation based on mutual trust and mutual benefit so that all
the partners can win. The win-win rhetoric suggests that China’s
economic rise does not threaten other states, but instead offers
them great business opportunities. As Hu Jintao (2008) stated, “We
should foster the idea that helping others is helping oneself and
make our endeavor on climate change a win-win for both
developed and developing countries and a win-win for both the
interests of individual countries and the common interests of
humanity.” He (2008) continued, “China is ready to work
unremittingly with the rest of the international community to
achieve harmonious, clean and sustainable development in the
world.”
Ideologically, pragmatism has dictated China’s strategic
thinking (Lee, Nedilsky, and Cheung, eds., 2012). The government
have doubled up the efforts to “replace socialist ideas and absorb
Confucianism as a dominant ideology” (Cho and Jeong, 2008: 471).
It no longer speaks of Marxism and Communism which are the
hyponyms of totalitarianism (Fairclough, 1989: 116). Currently,
China seeks to soften its global image, to cultivate its soft power,
and to reduce the fear of the “China threat” by highlighting its
benevolent Confucianism as a source of political inspiration. In
diplomacy, China has drawn on the Confucian values and
terminologies to “project a pacifist cultural image” (Cao, 2007: 436).
For instance, the government launched the lexicon of “harmonious
world” at the United Nations Summit in 2005 (Ding, 2008: 193).
7
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The government equally reiterates the lexicon of harmony in the
international climate policy negotiations. By using metaphors with
positive connotations, it sets out to consolidate solidarity and
togetherness with the developing world. “Our homeland” and
“Mother Earth” in particular can be interpreted by the global
community as universal values that “play an important role in
argumentation because they allow us to present specific values,
those upon which specific groups reach agreement, as more
determined aspects of these universal values” (Perelman, 1982: 26–
27). These wordings can be seen in many official announcements:
“China’s policies, measures, and actions to combat climate change,
demonstrate the country’s sense of responsibility for the survival
and development of mankind and the future of our Mother Earth”
(Delegation of China, 2009). “The international community must
act in accordance with the principles and provisions of the
UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. It must recognize that helping
others is helping oneself and harming others is harming oneself,
actively tackle climate change, and work together to make our
homeland a better place” (Wen Jiabao, 2008).
In the early 1990s, Joseph Nye Jr. introduced the concept of
soft power (i.e., the ability to get what one wants through
attraction and persuasion rather than coercion and dominance) to
conceptualize the complexity of post-Cold War politics. In fact, the
ancient Chinese philosophers had long identified consensus as a
key to survival and development. The contemporary concept of
soft power is too American-centric because the American values
and practices are being seen as global while they are not. On the
surface, the Chinese political ideals do not match the American
ones such as human rights, democracy, and freedom. China,
however, has appealed to many countries with its own version of
soft power, focusing on “economic benefits, shared norms and
8
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values, cooperation on non-traditional issues, infatuation with new
China, the mutual benefits of tourism and education, diplomacy
and style, and networking and reciprocal obligations within ethnic
Chinese communities.” In contrast to the American soft power,
China’s soft power is inclusive and interactive because it “derives
from Beijing’s courtship and what regional neighbors perceive as
mutual benefits” (Percival, 2007: 111–113). One irresistible
attraction of China’s modernization is the model of statecontrolled economic development, and some academics have
promoted the Beijing Consensus as an alternative to the
Washington Consensus (Ramo, 2004).
As China rises to power, it has the political will and
resources to address a wider range of diplomatic issues. In the last
two decades, China generated much goodwill by offering loans,
grants, debt relief, conventional weapons, scholarships, and
infrastructural investments to Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin
America. On global climate change, China identifies with the
developing world and expresses its willingness to help the poor
countries to “improve their capability to mitigate and adapt to
climate change” (Information Office of the State Council of the
People’s Republic of China, 2011). As Xie Zhenhua (2010) stated,
“China has strong sympathy for the negative impacts of climate
change faced by lesser developed countries, small island countries,
African countries and other developing countries.” Christine
Beuermann (1997: 220) comments that the “issue of climate change
is regarded as an opportunity to demonstrate and defend China’s
claim and self-perception as a major player in world politics and to
be leader of and speaker for developing countries.” By portraying
itself as the victim of Western colonialism, China succeeded in
differentiating itself from the West and gaining much support in
the developing world. This rhetoric enabled China to become an
9
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“old and true friend of the African people,” even though the
“friendship with various dictators” may undermine its prestige in
the West (Ding, 2008: 201–202). Because China never holds good
governance as a precondition for offering aid, the developed
world worries that China’s increasing presence in Africa would
obstruct the growth of civil society.
China has framed climate change as a global challenge that
can be solved by “extensive international cooperation” between
the developed and developing world (Information Office of the
State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2008). The
Communist leaders have made “full use of the United Nations’
General Assembly” and other multilateral institutions to bargain
with the United States and the European Union. China has not
only become an active member in all multilateral bodies but also
created new regional forums such as the ASEAN Plus Three and
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to advance its agendas.
While in favor of the regional and sectional climate cooperation,
China often refers to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol as the “most
authoritative,

universal,

and

comprehensive

international

framework for coping with climate change” (Information Office of
the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2008). All
other informal consultations are “supplements to rather than
substitutes for the negotiation process of the UNFCCC and the
Kyoto Protocol” which provide “the basic framework and legal
foundation of international cooperation for addressing climate
change” (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s
Republic of China, 2011). China’s decision to uphold the U.N.
system is a pragmatic one. It endorses the principle of “common
but differentiated responsibilities” that would exempt China from
meeting the greenhouse gas emission reduction targets.
10
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China’s participation in the multilateral dialogues has been
shown to be an indicative of its integration into the global society.
Thomas C. Schelling (1966: 150) argues that actions are important
pieces of evidence of one’s political commitment and credibility,
whereas “words are cheap and not inherently credible.” Similarly,
Chaïm Perelman (1982: 93) asserts that “past acts contribute to the
good or bad reputation of the agent,” and that argumentation by
giving examples is “to presuppose the existence of certain
regularities of which the examples provide concretization.”
Presenting only one example is not always convincing, but if a
speaker gives “a number of examples of the same sort,” the
argumentation may “move from the specific case toward a
generalization.” Therefore, a series of examples convince the
audience about the speaker’s argumentation (Ibid., 106). This is
particularly true for China, which has implemented numerous
policies to mitigate climate change, and has reduced the amount of
CO2 emissions at home. According to Su Wei of the DirectorGeneral Office of China’s National Leading Group on Climate
Change (2007), “China is ACTING. We will do what we should do
and will do what we can do. We don’t care much for the
recognition of what we’ve done. All we care for is the wellbeing
and the future of mankind.” Premier Wen also stated (2009), “The
Chinese government has set the target for mitigating greenhouse
gas emissions. This is a voluntary action China has taken in light
of its national circumstances. We have not attached any condition
to the target, nor have we linked it to the target of any other
country. We will honor our word with real action.” These remarks
reflect the growing sense of confidence among the Chinese leaders
in the debate on climate change.
As with many countries, China prefers non-binding
guidelines to binding greenhouse gas emission reduction targets.
11
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Before the Durban Conference in 2011, China proposed voluntary
national objectives, but in Durban, China set five conditions for
accepting a legally binding international treaty on climate change
after 2020. These conditions included: first, rich nations pledge to
enforce new carbon-cutting targets in the second commitment
period under the Kyoto Protocol; second, the world launches the
Green Climate Fund as they had agreed in Cancun under a
supervisory regime; third, all countries implement the consensus
of adaptation; fourth, rich nations transfer environmental
technology to developing countries; and fifth, there is a guarantee
of transparency and capability building in the greenhouse gas
emission reduction treaty (The China Daily, December 6, 2011). On
the surface, China’s announcement reflected its new commitment
to tackling climate change. But China’s conditions were so rigid
that left no room for negotiation. As Donald Bailey (December 6,
2011) comments, “China’s current position actually remains pretty
much what it has always been: It will accept legally binding limits
on its greenhouse gas emissions when Hell freezes over.”
Despite its rejection of an international climate change treaty,
China has taken major steps to reduce its greenhouse gas
emissions. The Chinese climate policy is linked to its energy policy.
A sufficient energy supply is vital for sustaining China’s economic
growth, which is fuelled by energy-intensive heavy industry. In
the past, the government only focused on energy supply, but it has
developed new hydropower and nuclear power reactors to reduce
its dependence on imported fossil fuels. Since 2009, China has
become the world’s leading investor in renewable energy (The
Pew Charitable Trusts, 2010). The share of renewable energy rose
from 8.4% in 2010 to 11.4% in 2011 (Nichols, 2012). In 2003, the
government set out to reduce energy demand through energy
conservation. It closed ineffective power plants and factories,
12
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promoted the use of energy-saving products, and established new
standards to reduce automotive pollution. The government has set
ambitious goals on energy efficiency. In the 12th Five-Year
Program (2011—2015), it pledges to cut energy consumption per
unit of gross domestic product by 16% and CO2 emissions by 17%
by 2015 (Chen, March 28, 2011).
To date, China has avoided the hazardous growth of
greenhouse gas emissions because its overall energy efficiency has
improved since 1980 (Gallagher, 2007). The energy conservation
programs, however, only achieve a relative cut in the CO2
emissions per unit of gross domestic product. There is no overall
reduction of the greenhouse gas emissions because economic
growth and rising energy consumption are the reasons for
constructing more coal plants. Over half of China’s primary
energy consumption still relies on coal (Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 2007: 63). By 2030, China’s greenhouse gas emissions
will be 400% above its 1990 level (Jakobson, 2009: 39). China’s
Science and Technology Minister unofficially announced that the
carbon emissions peak “would definitely come between 2030 and
2040.” Many scholars estimate China’s carbon emissions to peak
between 2020 and 2050 (Watts, December 6, 2009). In addition, the
ultimate reason for prioritizing renewable energy is to cut the cost
of energy production and to gain energy security. The 11th FiveYear Plan (2006-2010) pledged to address “the impacts of energy
shortages on the economy and the country’s rising dependency on
external energy sources” (Richerzhagen and Scholz, 2008: 311-312).
Even though energy security and economic development take
precedence over the concern for climate protection, the Chinese
leaders are moving in the right direction. Nevertheless, many
developed countries are skeptical of the efficacy of China’s
greenhouse gas emission reduction plans because there is no
13
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compliance enforcement. They continue to urge China, the world’s
highest CO2 emitter, to adhere to a binding agreement in order to
tackle climate change.

4. China as a Poor Developing Country
Despite its economic boom, China is classified as a developing
country. As many as 128 million rural inhabitants live under the
official poverty line of US$1.25 a day. The central government sees
it necessary to “complete the historical task of industrialization
and urbanization” (Information Office of the State Council of the
People’s Republic of China, 2011). In formulating its discourse of
climate change, China underlines its status as a poor country and
reminds the developed world that its national development is a
formidable task (Information Office of the State Council of the
People’s Republic of China, 2008). As economic growth is of
decisive importance, the government is unwilling to take dramatic
actions that would raise the cost of doing business in China.
Otherwise, the foreign investors would move to countries with
cheaper labor and less strict climate standards.
Global climate change, however, has threatened China’s
ecological system and its socioeconomic development. In financial
terms, Nicholas Stern (2006: 106) estimates that from 1988 to 2004,
“China experienced economic losses from drought and flood
equating to 1.2% and 0.8% of GDP, respectively.” J. Timmons
Roberts and Bradley C. Parks (2007) draw attention to the number
of people killed, made homeless, or otherwise damaged by
climate-related disasters such as floods, heat waves, droughts, and
windstorms. From 1980 to 2002, 45,000 people were killed and fifty
million became homeless in climate-related disasters (Roberts and
Parks, 2007: 76). It is difficult to assess the extent to which global
14
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climate change led to many previous natural disasters. But many
Chinese are still living in areas vulnerable to climate-related risks,
and the frequency and intensity of disasters will continue to rise.
Scientific findings suggest that climate patterns are changing in
China: the average surface temperature increased between 0.5°C
and 0.8°C in the twentieth century; the mountain glaciers are
melting at an accelerated rate; the intensity of heat waves becomes
severe in many provinces in the north; and there is a heavy
precipitation in the south. Many inland lakes and rivers have dried
up due to the rapid economic and population growth. Serious
water shortages will lead to a fall in agricultural output, raising
alarm about food security (National Development and Reform
Commission, 2007). At least 150 million people need to be
relocated due to climate change (Watts, May 18, 2009).
China is aware of the devastating impacts of global climate
change, and has criticized the West for imposing a greenhouse gas
emission reduction agreement on the world. As Wen Jiabao (2008)
pointed out, “If we look at the world history of development, we
will see that developed countries encountered their resource and
environmental challenges during the course of 200 years of
industrialization. But we are confronted with the challenges at the
same time. In addition, we have to address in a much shorter time
frame the issue of energy conservation and pollution control
which has taken the developed countries decades to tackle after
they became highly developed. The difficulties we face are
therefore unprecedented.” China has aligned itself with the G77
group in climate change debates. Seeing environmental protection
as compatible with poverty eradication, China demands all climate
change actions to be in line with the United Nations Millennium
Goals. By framing climate change as a development issue, China
insists that technological solutions are the key to the success of
15
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climate protection. China still needs the financial and technological
support of the West but it does not intend to seek assistance
explicitly. Rhetorically, China finds it more feasible to speak of the
needs of all developing nations as a group rather than its own
interests. For example, Hu Jintao (2008) called on the developed
countries “to attain the goal of emission reduction defined in the
[Kyoto] Protocol and take concrete measures to honor their
commitments of providing funding and technology transfer to
developing countries.” Similarly, Liu Zhenmin (2007) asserts that
“the key to addressing climate change lies with technological
progress

and with

the

establishment

of

production

and

consumption patterns that meet the requirements of sustainable
development. The experience of various countries shows that
technology is decisive in mitigating and adapting to climate
change.” The West cannot deny the developing world’s request for
assistance. If the former agrees to transfer funding and technology
to the latter, China will definitely benefit.
The characterization of China as “the largest developing
country in the world” may not be accurate. Since the developing
countries are not a homogenous group and have little in common,
the West proposes these countries (non-Annex I countries) to
regroup themselves in the future. China publicly opposes this
proposal because of its refusal to follow any legally binding
greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. Furthermore, there are
no sub-categories between developed and developing nations for
China, and this would weaken its diplomatic position in the
international climate negotiations. China does not want to be left
alone in the negotiations and therefore, in addition to its alliance
with the G77, it strengthens cooperation amongst the BASIC (i.e.,
Brazil, South Africa, India and China) countries. The BASIC
countries have played an increasingly important role in global
16
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politics.

In

2007,

the

BASIC

collectively

accounted

for

approximately 40% of the world’s population, and 29% of the
world’s overall GHG emissions, of which China’s share was about
17% (Hallding et al., 2011: 32). Despite the group’s internal
differences such as the level of industrialization and that of CO2
emissions per capita, the BASIC formed an alliance against any
binding greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. Brazil and
South Africa, however, have “indicated an openness to the idea”
of negotiating a binding climate change agreement (Ibid., 93).
Because China is still conditioned by the psychological
burden of the century of shame, it sees itself a powerless country
incapable of tackling the unprecedented climate change. The
government acknowledges the problem of its greenhouse gas
emissions, but it defends itself by separating the subsistence
emissions of the poor from the luxury emissions of the rich. The
luxury emissions of rich countries are excessive and should be
restricted, whereas the “subsistence emissions” of developing
countries are the matter of life and death. China has created new
vocabularies to frame the climate change discussion.
Given its export-driven development strategy, China has not
only become the “world’s factory, but also its smokestack” (Kahn
and Landler, December 21, 2007). A significant proportion of its
CO2 emissions are actually “offshore emissions” and the Western
consumers should be responsible for the increase of GHG
emissions in China. For instance, 23% of China’s CO2 emissions
are caused by manufacturing goods exported to the West (Wang
and Watson, 2007), and half of its increase results from the
production of electronics, metals, chemicals, and textile goods
(Guan et al., 2009). As the West outsourced their factories and CO2
emissions to “pollution heavens” like China, this economic
restructuring has reduced the level of pollution at home. For
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example, after moving its factories to China, Germany has reduced
its greenhouse gas emissions by 19% yearly since 1990 (Kahn and
Landler, December 21, 2007). If one takes into account this
structural factor, one should not blame China for being the world’s
largest CO2 emitter. Instead, it is necessary to reform the current
system of international climate politics that only penalizes those
poor workers in the developing world rather than rich consumers
in the developed nations. The post-Kyoto negotiations should face
the challenge of reducing the scale of consumption rather than that
of greenhouse gas emissions in the production process.

5. Discussion
The Chinese engagement in the realm of global climate politics
makes itself “a nation with a dual-identity” (Wu, 2001: 293). On
the one hand, the government emphasizes the state’s role as a
“peace loving, responsible actor.” This discourse suggests that as a
credible and benevolent member of the international community,
China has taken the issue of climate change seriously. On the other
hand, China calls itself a “developing country” and a victim of
global climate change. Therefore, it should receive the financial
and technological support of the West to deal with the problem.
This dualist nature is a key to understanding the Chinese climate
change diplomacy. In general, China has become “more proactive,
more engaged, and more flexible” in the international negotiations
since the Bali Conference in 2008 (Liang, 2010: 68). Unlike the
United States and Canada that withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol,
the Chinese participation in climate change dialogues has not only
improved its image but also made the call for multilateralism more
appealing to the world.
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Seen from this perspective, some commentators have urged
China to replace its sense of victimhood with that of normal
mentality on an international stage (Deng, 2005: 60). China can
hardly justify itself as a developing country because of the
economic boom. With the extravagance of the 2008 Beijing
Olympics, it is difficult to convince foreigners that China is a poor
nation in need of financial assistance (Jakonson, 2009: 26). Hence,
China should abandon the discourse of dualism and support the
regrouping of the non-Annex I countries. In so doing, China could
strengthen its image as a credible global power. So far, the BASIC
group has provided China with a platform to advance its
diplomatic agendas and to push “a hard line as a collective rather
than an individual” member-state (Hallding et al., 2011: 76). As the
world’s second largest economy and a rising power, China should
set the climate change agenda amongst the BASIC countries.
Without the commitment and support of the developed
nations, however, the BASIC group has to appropriate the sense of
victimhood as a bargaining power. Unless the developed countries
change their position and provide assistance to the developing
world, China has difficulty living up to its projected image as a
responsible actor. According to Sarah Raine (2009), the West has to
keep reminding China of the respect for democracy, good
governance, and the rule of law. “If they do so consistently and
fairly, this is likely to impact China’s thinking.” While China
worries about the global opinion, “it will balance this listening
with watching what others do.” Instead, the West should set a
model for China by doing their share in global climate protection
and by coordinating with the developing world. To date, the
Chinese leaders remain frustrated with the West because the latter
seldom appreciates the environmental progress of China.

19

Social and Cultural Research Occasional Paper No.13
Nevertheless, China is keen to maintain its favorable image
as a cooperative partner of the international community. The fear
of losing face may constrain its behaviors. As China wants to be
treated as a responsible stakeholder, its climate change policy is
partially shaped by the international pressure. Besides these
external factors, China is under strong domestic pressures to
reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. After all, environmental
protection and energy security are not exclusive to one another.
Both issues are essential for sustaining economic growth and
reducing social discontent. China has expressed its willingness to
meet the absolute greenhouse gas emission reduction targets in the
future as long as the West pledges to provide assistance. Evidently,
China and the West have yet to work together to address global
climate change.
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